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Introduction
For a variety of reasons competitive …rms turn to each other and collaborate on their R&D strategies. Collaborating enables …rms to share costs and risks, and have access to each other's technology, markets and products.
Together with their partners …rms can exploit economies of scale in the generation and distribution of R&D, bene…t from the synergy e¤ects from exchanging and sharing complementary know-how.
Despite its potential bene…ts, there is considerable evidence that inter…rm collaboration often carries a high risk of failure and has a short life-span. Kogut (1989) , in a study of joint ventures in the United States, …nds that 54% were terminated within the …rst seven years. He observes that the signi…cant number of terminations of joint ventures in their early years suggests that many of these terminations are a result of business failure. 1 A more recent study by Arthur Andersen (Alliance Analyst, 1996) …nds that 30% of alliances were reported as outright "failures" and another 27% were "unsatisfactory". More recently, Dyer and Powell (2002) study the government funded research joint ventures and identify key determinants of success from interviews with both government project managers (from the Advanced Technology Program (ATP)) and representatives of companies participating in 18 joint venture R&D projects on manufacturing technologies of special relevance to the automobile industry. They …nd that one of the main factors detracting from the project's success is the cost of coordinating the venture's R&D activities which is found to increase with the consortium size. They note that several interviewees cited the problem associated with having too many participants 2 and then suggest that there may be a maximum number of companies that can e¤ectively coordinate on R&D project.
The coordination costs problem may arise from the interdependence of 1 Harrigan (1985) …nds that almost 50% of alliances end in failure. 2 For example, one strong opinion cited: "When we joined the ATP program we didn't realize there would be so many participants. From my perspective, there were just too many. First, it took so long getting to know everyone. In addition, scheduling meetings was a nightmare; we had to schedule meetings a year in advance. It was just too di¢ cult to coordinate.... I would never get involved in such a large one again." (Dyer and Powell (2002) ). tasks assigned to partners within an alliance (Gulati and Singh (1998) ). The higher the interdependence, the greater the information they must possess while the alliance is in progress. The high level of interdependence is often seen in technology alliances where partners aim to share complementary technology, jointly reducing the time needed for innovation, or joint development of new technology. All these alliances require ongoing inputs from all partners and constant updating of R&D information. 3 This generally signals high coordination costs. Nonetheless inter-organizational trust may mitigate problems associated with high coordination costs. 4 Firms that trust each other tend to have a greater awareness, or a willingness to become aware of the rules, routines, and procedures that each follows. All these factors dictate the level of di¢ culty in inter-…rm coordination, and thus determine how costly the various R&D tasks can be.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been very little theoretical work on modeling explicitly the cost associated with forming or running an RJV.
Most standard multi-stage models assume implicitly that launching such cooperation is costless (for example, Katz (1986) , Kamien et al. (1992) , Poyago-Theotoky (1995) ). This means that the cost of monitoring R&D inputs and outputs, contracting and management or the expense of ensuring a high standard of coordination have been largely neglected. Katz (1986) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995) allow RJV size to range from two members to industry-wide, but only one RJV to be formed in their oligopolistic framework. With the absence of coordination costs, Katz (1986) shows that even though the industry-wide cooperative agreement which supports complete information sharing causes a fall in e¤ective R&D as …rms tend to free-ride on each other's R&D, welfare always increases through cost saving owing to the rise in R&D e¢ ciency. We show that this result may no longer hold when coordinating R&D activities within the RJV is costly. 3 The coordination costs issue might get more serious when the technological exchange/sharing process among alliance members takes place bilaterally. R&D experts and scientists from the member …rm who come up with an innovation may have to tour around to train or supervise R&D technicians of other member …rms one at a time. 4 Trust typically results from prior interactions; …rms might have developed together routines that help easing joint interactions such as exchange of information between them.
Poyago-Theotoky (1995) shows that for any level of involuntary spillovers among all …rms in the industry, an RJV-…rm always generates more R&D investment than a non-RJV …rm in the case where the coordination costs are absent, as the RJV members bene…t from full information and cost sharing.
The member …rms …nd that there exists a critical size of the RJV beyond which their individual pro…t will fall, because the bene…t of information and cost sharing the standing members get from the admission of a newcomer is outweighed by the negative e¤ect arising from competing with relatively tougher competitors in the product market. In contrast, we show that once the coordination costs determines a …rm's marginal cost of R&D, the RJV…rms may not invest more than outsiders or the independent …rm under R&D competition when the coordination costs are relatively high. Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) were the …rst to incorporate explicitly the cost arising from forming an RJV. However, their analysis is limited to duopolistic competition and the cost of forming an RJV is viewed as …xed and does not depend on the scale of R&D output achieved. As a result, the issues regarding the size of research joint ventures and the costs which can vary according to the R&D activities undertaken were naturally left out.
We aim to partially …ll this gap in the literature by asking how the coordination costs of operating the RJV a¤ect its performance (e.g., the member's equilibrium R&D, quantities, and pro…ts) and to what extent an RJV is still preferable when compared to independent R&D competition.
Since coordination costs tend to increase with the size of the research joint venture, we postulate that the marginal cost of R&D increases with the number of participants in the venture.
We …nd that the presence of coordination costs not only decreases each RJV …rm's pro…t but alters a …rm's expectation of the bene…t it would get from being a member of the RJV. Initially we consider a general functional form for the coordination costs. For a given size of the RJV, its members decrease their own R&D as the anticipated coordination costs increase. This results in lower output and pro…ts. On the contrary, the non-RJV …rms increase their R&D investments in response to the fall in the RJV …rms' R&D. The latter supply greater quantities to the market and pro…t more.
We show that the performance of the RJV in terms of R&D investment, pro…t and welfare in relation to R&D competition is sensitive to the level of coordination costs.
Next, we choose an appropriate functional form for the coordination costs, so that a more detailed investigation of their e¤ects on …rms'investment strategies can be carried out. We show that, although the RJV as a whole may no longer conduct a unit of R&D at a lower cost compared to the independent …rm under the non-cooperative R&D regime, its members can still make savings on their own R&D expense through information sharing.
We then address the question of how this drawback a¤ects both the equilibrium size of the RJV (which is determined privately by the RJV members) and the socially optimal RJV size (which maximizes the societal welfare).
We show that not only the equilibrium size becomes smaller as the burden of coordination costs gets larger, but the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the optimal sizes is wider as the coordination costs problem becomes more serious. One important message from our analysis is that by ignoring the coordination costs of operating the RJV, the anticipated bene…ts or success of the cooperative project could have been grossly exaggerated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the R&D competition regime in the oligopolistic framework. The model of a research joint venture with general coordination costs is formalized in section 3. Section 4 compares the two R&D regimes. In section 5 we investigate the e¤ects of RJV expansion and look into the issue of the equilibrium size and optimal size of the RJV. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
Proofs of the various propositions appear in the Appendix.
R&D Competition
In this section we discuss brie ‡y the standard model of R&D competition in an oligopolistic environment. 5 There are n identical …rms selling a homogenous product in a market with linear inverse demand P = A P n i=1 q i ;where P; A and q i denote price, market size and …rm i's output respectively. Con- 5 See also Katz (1986) , Kamien et al. (1992) , and Suzumura (1992). We consider a two-stage game. Firms make decisions independently and simultaneously on R&D outputs in the …rst stage, taking each others'R&D decisions as given. They then compete in quantity in the second stage, on the basis of the marginal production costs from the previous stage. We use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept, solving the game backwards.
In the second stage, each …rm chooses its output to maximize pro…ts, yielding equilibrium output for …rm i of
with the associated equilibrium price, p = A+ P n j c j n+1 , and equilibrium pro…ts
Substituting for unit costs expression (2) can be written
where X i = P n i6 =j x j and K A c > 0 measures the 'e¤ective'market size.
In the …rst stage, each …rm chooses R&D output to maximize second stage pro…t net of R&D costs, i.e.
The …rst order condition, provides …rm i's investment best-response function:
n :
, and we assume that > 0 (i.e. > 1). 6 Note that R&D outputs are strategic substitutes, since an increase in X i reduces the equilibrium product price, and consequently the marginal pro…tability of x i . Thus, …rm i's incentive to invest decreases.
Since all …rms are identical, we consider a symmetric equilibrium whose solutions are shown in Table 1 . It is easily checked that as the industry expands, each …rm invests less in R&D, 7 as its prospective pro…t decreases.
However, total R&D is not adversely a¤ected. 8 There are two distinctive incentives for a …rm to invest in R&D in this model. Firstly, to reduce its own cost of production and secondly, to create a cost gap between itself and its rivals. Since there are no knowledge spillovers, the …rm's R&D output will not bene…t other …rms, the second incentive works e¤ectively. 
When …rms cooperate and form a research joint venture (RJV), we assume that they enter into a full information sharing agreement, and are successful 6 The corresponding second order condition requires that > 2n 2 (n+1) 2 :
8 in preventing any leakage of information to outsiders. 9 Owing to diminishing returns in R&D, it is optimal for each member …rm to keep its research lab open, and to communicate its discoveries to the other members. 10 As a consequence, the e¤ective R&D output of a member of the RJV is the sum of R&D outputs achieved by all the members. However, keeping several labs working in parallel can involve signi…cant coordination and management costs if duplication is to be avoided.
Suppose that an RJV exists with k members, 1 6 k 6 n, leaving n k independent …rms. Within the RJV (i 2 R), information is fully shared.
Unit costs of independent …rms'(i 2 N ) are reduced only by their individual R&D investments: Consequently, …rm i's unit cost of production is
where X R is the total R&D output of the RJV. We capture R&D coordination costs by writing the R&D cost function of a typical member as
The more members in the RJV, the higher the cost of any given level of R&D for each member. 11 The output stage is exactly as described in the previous section, …rms compete independently on quantity. At the R&D stage, the RJV acts as a centralized decision maker for its member …rms, so there are e¤ectively n k + 1 players at this stage. To minimize the cost from producing its total R&D output ( X R ); the RJV will choose a uniform level of R&D output across members (i.e.
The second stage unit production cost of each member is then c r = c kx r : The RJV objective is 9 Poyago-Theotoky (1999) …nds that …rms will choose to fully disclose their information in the cooperative R&D equilibrium. Her conclusion lends support to the assumption made by a number of papers on RJVs with exogenous spillovers, for example Kamien et al. (1992 9 to maximize the pro…t net of R&D cost of a representative member,
where X N = P j2N x j is the total R&D output by independent …rms. From the …rst order condition, we obtain the best-response function of the representative RJV member,
, and we assume 12 that G(k) > 1:
An independent …rm j chooses its R&D output, x j , to maximize its own pro…ts net of R&D costs
Using the …rst-order condition 13 yields the best-response function for …rm j,
Since all independent …rms are identical, in a symmetric solution x j = x i = x n where i; j 2 N: Using this symmetry, the representative RJVmember …rm and outsider …rm best-response functions are as follows
Since both these functions have negative slopes, R&D is a strategic sub-
stitute. An increase in the RJV …rm'R&D will lead to a fall in the marginal Solving (3) and (4)we obtain the equilibrium R&D outputs
where
In Figure 1 , a r and b r represent the x r and x n -intercepts of x r (x n ) re-
while a n and b n represent the x n and x r -intercepts of x n (x r ) respectively
Equilibrium A in Figure 1 illustrates the unique interior and stable solution where both RJV members and outsider …rms invest in R&D. 14 For this equilibrium to hold, we require that coordination costs are su¢ ciently high. Speci…cally, we require (i) that a r < b n for which a su¢ cient condition, since a r is decreasing in g(k) and is therefore largest when g(k) = , is > 1 (k); and (ii) a n < b r , for which > 0 is su¢ cient. Observing that
0 > 0 , a su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium with both types of …rm R&D active is that > 1 (k): 15 The corresponding equilibrium values are summarized in Table 2 . 
How do coordination costs 16 a¤ect these equilibria values for a given size of the RJV? In the last column of Table 2 , we report the comparative statics obtained. 17 These shed some light on how accounting for coordination 1 4 The stability conditions for an RJV-…rm and an outsider …rm require
and >
respectively. Both are imposed on our analysis: 1 5 Note that 1 (k) reaches its maximum when k = 
Comparing R&D regimes
In this section we provide a comparison of the R&D regimes in terms of R&D output, quantities, pro…ts and welfare.
Proposition 1 Given > 1 (k) > 0 ; > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exist critical values for the coordination costs, g 1 ; g 2 and g 3 where g 1 < g 3 < g 2 , such that R&D output is ranked as follows:
These critical values are given by g 1
When there are no coordination costs, g(k) = ; so that An outsider …rm realizes that when the RJV is costly to operate, ceteris paribus, an RJV-…rm reduces its R&D as a result of a decrease in its marginal pro…tability (compared to that when there exist no coordination costs).
Since R&D is a strategic substitutes for both sets of …rms, the outsider …rm will then increase its R&D when it sees the reduction in the RJV-…rm's R&D. Depending on the size of the coordination costs, if they are su¢ -ciently high, the outsider …rm's R&D can overtake that of the independent …rm under the non-cooperative regime. This will only occur if both have identical production costs at the second (quantity) stage, which requires that kx r = x n from the …rst. From the solutions in Table 2 this only occurs if = G(k): Substituting we …nd the corresponding coordination cost function is
Further, with this cost function 20 , q r = q n = b q, the common …rm output in the R&D competition equilibrium. This implies that outsider-…rm R&D output and pro…ts are as in the R&D competition equilibrium, as are total industry sales and therefore consumer surplus. But the RJV members are able to take advantage of their sharing of R&D output, so that x r = x n k and, despite the coordination costs, members pro…ts exceed those of outsiders,
This implies that total industry pro…ts, and therefore total welfare, exceeds that in the R&D competition regime. Combining this with the comparative static results from Table 2 and the results in Table 1 , we summarize these …ndings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Given > 1 (k) > 0 ; > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exists a critical value of coordination costs g 2 = 1 (k) ; such that: (ii) If g(k) > g 2 , q n > b q > q r , but total sales and hence consumer surplus are less than in the R&D competition equilibrium, CS < d CS.
(iii) If g(k) < g 2 ; q r > b q > q n , but total sales and hence consumer surplus are higher than in the R&D competition equilibrium, CS > d CS.
We then provide a detailed comparison of equilibrium pro…ts.
Proposition 3 Given > 1 (k) > 0 ; > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exist critical values of coordination costs: g 2 ; g 4 and g 5 ; where g 2 < g 5 < g 4 such that:
With coordination costs, the RJV …rms invest less than they would have done if there were no coordination costs, hence they experience lower total cost reduction, and consequently supply less output to the market and make less pro…ts (i.e.
d r dg(k) < 0). Also, a unit of R&D is more costly when there are coordination costs. On the contrary, the non-RJV …rms bene…t more. This is because they take into account the fact that the RJV …rms would reduce their investments and supply less, which means that the non-RJV …rms'prospective market shares are then higher. As a result, the non-RJV …rms invest more, supply more and hence gain higher pro…t when running the RJV is costly compared to when there are no coordination costs (i.e.
When maximizing joint pro…ts, the RJV …rms take into consideration all possible costs arising from the production of R&D and consequently each of them restricts the amount of R&D conducted on its own, and relies more on the information sharing option with other members. If the coordination costs are not too high, the RJV …rm still bene…ts from being a member of the RJV, as its pro…t is still higher than its non-RJV rival's and that of the independent …rm under the non-cooperative regime. For example, when the coordination costs are linear in k (i.e. g(k) = k); the result r > b > n still holds. As for the non RJV …rm, the increase in its investment in response to the reduction in the RJV …rms'R&D raises its total reduction in marginal cost, and thus, its quantity supplied and pro…t 21 . If the coordination costs are su¢ ciently large, the non-RJV …rm's pro…t can be even higher than that of the RJV …rm.
Finally, we provide a brief welfare comparison across regimes.
Simulations 22 show that g 2 < g 6 < g 5 :In the case of no coordination costs, i.e. g(k) = ; since < g 2 < g 6 ; it implies that W > c W ; the RJV regime always bene…ts society more than R&D competition. This result rea¢ rms that of Katz (1986) . When coordination costs are present, W > c W does not hold always. Recall that dW dg(k) < 0; welfare decreases in the coordination costs. This is largely attributed to the fall in the consumer surplus. When coordination costs become too large, W < c W ; this happens for g(k) > g 6 :
E¤ects of RJV expansion on equilibrium and optimal RJV size
In this section, we address the issue of coordination costs that change purely due to the variation in a number of participants of the RJV and explore how the equilibrium and optimal size of RJV vary in response. Provided that a …rm's pro…t is higher if it is a member of the RJV, no …rm would want to be left out as an outsider of the alliance, thus if a current non-RJV …rm 2 1 Unlike in Poyago-Theotoky (1995), we assume no spillovers of R&D in this study, the non-RJV …rms will not bene…t at all from a formation of RJV. The increase in the non-RJV …rm's pro…t comes from the rise in its investment to substitute for the fall in the RJV …rm's R&D. 2 2 The simulation results (Mathematica) are available from the authors upon request.
is allowed to join the existing RJV, it would de…nitely do so. However, we assume that the current members of the RJV are concerned only with their own pro…ts and they, and only they, have power to decide whether or not to invite any more …rms to join the agreement. In other words, the existing members of the RJV have the right to block a …rm that wishes to join in if such RJV expansion would result in a fall of the existing member's pro…t.
Thus, we de…ne "equilibrium size of RJV " as follows.
De…nition. The equilibrium size of an RJV, k e ; is such that the representative member's …rst-stage pro…t (i.e. production pro…t net of R&D expenditure) is maximized. Thus k e must satisfy the following conditions:
This k e indicates the number of participants in RJV that makes the RJV stable. Conditions (i) and (ii) are required so that the existing members agree not to let another …rm join the RJV 23 , while condition (iii) guarantees that no member …rm wants to drop out as the pro…t it would get if it were to leave the RJV is lower. Technically, by setting d r dk = 0, we …nd the equilibrium size of the RJV.
Next we de…ne the "optimal size of RJV" simply as the size that would generate the maximum social surplus.The optimal size of RJV, k opt ; is found by setting dW dk = 0: However, due to computational complexity, a closed form solution for k e and k opt cannot be found, hence we have resorted to extensive numerical simulations (see further down).
To simplify the analysis, from now on, we use an explicit functional form for g(k) which shows increasing marginal cost of R&D as the RJV expands in size. In particular, let,
A …rm's total cost of R&D is then k x 2 i 2 : Let e X denote the total R&D investment of the RJV, hence the production marginal cost of each member …rm is c e X: The pro…t maximizing process of the RJV tells us that each member …rm is assigned to produce an identical amount of R&D output, so each …rm invests;
The R&D cost of each member …rm, R r , is
; while the total R&D cost of the RJV, R RJV ; is: Table 3 shows the R&D expense incurred by each RJV member and by the RJV as a whole from producing e X units of R&D in three di¤erent scenarios: (1) no coordination costs ( = 0); (2) when coordination costs are linear in k ( = 1); (3) when coordination costs are quadratic in k ( = 2): Table 3 :
An independent …rm producing R&D output of e X; must pay e X 2 2 : Comparing e X 2 2 with R RJV ( = 0), we …nd that the RJV with no coordination costs is more e¢ cient at conducting R&D than a single independent …rm, in other words, the RJV can produce a unit of R&D output at a lower cost.
Also, an increase in k; for a given e X; reduces the RJV's total cost of R&D.
When the RJV is operating with no coordination costs, the ability to share information among members brings about the e¢ ciency in conducting R&D, such that the RJV has R&D cost advantage over the independent …rm. Now the natural question to ask is when coordination costs are formalized in the model, can the costly RJV maintain such research cost advantage?
We compare
2 with R RJV ( = 1), and …nd that the RJV is no longer more e¢ cient compared to the independent …rm; in addition, an admission of a new member has no e¤ect at all on the total cost of R&D incurred to the RJV. However, the cost of R&D to each member …rm (when = 1) is smaller if the RJV expands, owing to bene…ts of the information and cost sharing within the RJV. Alternatively, if = 2; the RJV becomes less e¢ cient in terms of research cost compared to the single …rm; the coordination costs are perceived as a big burden to the RJV such that the RJV has R&D cost disadvantage compared to the independent …rm.
The case of = 1 (i.e. the coordination costs are linear in k) is an interesting borderline case; this is because the admission of one more …rm into the RJV will not make the RJV as a whole more cost e¢ cient than the independent …rm, but does make R&D cheaper from each member's viewpoint.
To return to the question of the equilibrium and optimal size of the RJV, given the use of simulations, we have to choose an appropriate range of for the function of the coordination costs, k : Since the RJV is no longer more cost e¢ cient compared to the independent …rm when > 1;
and simulations show that the …rms' incentive to form an RJV may not exist for very high coordination cost ( > 1:2); as the pro…t of the non-RJV overtakes that of the member …rm, we …nd it sensible to concentrate on the case where varies between 0 and 1. The cases presented in Table 4 Note that for a given size of the industry, the equilibrium and the optimal size of the RJV are rounded to the nearest integer in Table 4 . Table 4 : Equilibrium versus Optimal Size of RJVthe consumer surplus to the RJV expansion has a large in ‡uence on social welfare which determines the optimal size of the RJV. Figure 2 shows what happens to the ratio k e n as coordination costs increase. 24 Observe that for a given ; Figure 3 shows the pattern of the ratio k e k op for a given : It indicates that the equilibrium size is always smaller than the optimal size. When there are no coordination costs, we …nd that k e k op can get closer to 1 as the industry becomes larger. Recall that the …rm's market share and its pro…tability fall as the industry expands and becomes more competitive. As a result, each …rm invests less. The standing members of the RJV are then willing to accept more members in order to bene…t from higher total cost reduction (through sharing) and to steal market share from the non-members. While society may be more reluctant to welcome a larger RJV since it takes into account the adverse e¤ect the formation of the RJV has on the non-member …rms'pro…ts. Thus, when the industry expands the equilibrium size of the RJV may increase at a faster rate compared to that of the optimal size. Consequently, the gap between the equilibrium and the optimal size gets smaller.
On the other hand, …gure 3 shows that when the coordination costs are present, the ratio k e k op falls continually as the industry expands. The coordination costs have more impact in limiting the equilibrium size of the RJV than the optimal size. This is because the non-RJV …rm's pro…t is usually higher in the case of coordination costs compared to its pro…t when the coordination costs are absent, and that alleviates the negative impact of the coordination costs on the social welfare. Hence we observe the decline in k e k op as the industry expands. Moreover, …gure 3 illustrates that for a given industry size, the discrepancy between the optimal and equilibrium size is wider as the coordination costs problem increases. This larger discrepancy implies that an R&D policy might be more called for to support the formation of a joint venture when coordination costs are high.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we hope to have made a contribution to the literature by addressing one important drawback of running an RJV, namely, the potential coordination costs associated with its running. In our model, these coordination costs were embodied in the cost e¢ ciency parameter of the R&D cost function; the larger the RJV, the costlier a unit of R&D output. We have established that increasing coordination costs reduce RJV-member's incentive to invest, so that the RJV could supply less to the market and pro…t less.
Also, unlike in the special case of Poyago-Theotoky (1995) where coordination costs did not exist, here the e¤ect of the coordination costs might su¢ ce to bring the equilibrium R&D of the RJV-…rm to a level below the R&D competition equilibrium level and below that of the non-RJV counterpart.
On the contrary, non-members increase their own R&D in response to a fall in the RJV …rms' R&D, thus they supply more to the market and pro…t more. However, the increase in the non-members'quantities is not enough to compensate for the fall in the RJV-…rms'outputs, as a result, consumer surplus falls. Although the total industry pro…t could rise as the non-RJV …rms now pro…t more, this is not su¢ cient to compensate for the fall in the consumer surplus. The overall e¤ect is thus a decline in social welfare. It is then possible that the R&D competition regime is socially preferable to the RJV regime, when coordination costs are su¢ ciently high.
In the second part of the analysis, we have used an explicit functional form for the coordination costs, i.e. g(k) = k ; with 0 < < 1, to concentrate more on the increase in the coordination costs which arose purely from an increase in size of the RJV. We showed that the burden the coordination costs could be so signi…cant that although the RJV-…rms still bene…t from the information sharing agreement between partners, the RJV as a whole no longer conducts cheaper R&D compared to the independent …rms under R&D competition. Further, coordination costs a¤ect dramatically the equilibrium and optimal sizes of the RJV. We no longer obtain the traditional result that the optimal size is equal to the number of …rms operating in the industry; also, as coordination costs increase the equilibrium size decreases, as expected.
Our analysis on coordination costs highlights the observation that perhaps the real gain in terms of pro…t and welfare from R&D cooperative ventures might have been exaggerated. In an environment where institutions or organizational designs were not ‡exible, were unsupportive to the ideas of coordination and information exchange, the R&D competition regime could easily outperform the RJV.
However, a word of caution is needed in interpreting our results broadly.
The model used has its limitations in the sense that it dealt with a homogenous product, a linear demand, and more importantly it allowed for only one RJV to be formed. In an alternative scenario where there could be more than one RJV, the members of one joint venture would realize that other …rms can group in competing joint ventures. The equilibrium size of these 25 RJVs might be larger than when only one RJV is allowed to form, as the potential RJV members would have to take into account the competitive e¤ect of the competing joint ventures, thus, may want to reduce the size of the rival ventures. In e¤ect, the RJV members may be more willing to tolerate the higher coordination costs arising from allowing more members as long as the reduction in their production marginal costs are still signi…cant.
We leave this issue for future research.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Using the expressions for welfare from Tables 1 and 2 and having substituted for ; 0 ; G(k) and 1 (k) into these we obtain: Following algebraic manipulations and given our assumptions, e D, e E; and e F > 0: The quadratic function f (g(k)) = (n + 1) e D(g(k)) 2 + k 2 (n k + 1) e E(g(k)) k 4 (n k + 1) 2 e F is concave in g(k), reaches its maximum when g(k) is positive, and is negative when g(k) = 0: Furthermore f (g(k)) > 0;
cuts the g(k) axis at: 
